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Foreword
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
I am pleased to write the Foreword to this special issue of the

Dutquesne Law Review dedicated to "Judicial Independence," a topic that has occupied my time and interest over the past few years.
After serving as an Associate Justice on the Supreme Court for 25
years, I feel strongly that lawyers and judges must work tirelessly
to strengthen the foundations of our democratic republic in order
to ensure its vitality for future generations. Ensuring the independence of our judicial branch is an essential element of our tripartite system of government.
James Madison, one of the fathers of our Constitution, declared
in the introduction of the Bill of Rights in Congress that an independent judiciary would serve as "an impenetrable bulwark
against every assumption of power in the Legislative or Executive."' Those are powerful words. In our common-law system
based on adherence to precedent and recognition of freedoms delineated in our Constitution and the Bill of Rights, it is essential
that members of the judicial branch serve as guardians to protect
against encroachment upon, or erosion of, those all-important
rights and privileges.
Alexander Hamilton, writing in Federalist No. 78, similarly emphasized that judicial independence is indispensable in the American system, because the judiciary is charged with ensuring that
the other branches of government adhere to our Constitution.
Hamilton wrote:
The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution. By a limited Constitution, I understand one which contains certain specified exceptions to the legislative authority; such, for instance, as that it
shall pass no bills of attainder, no ex-post-facto laws, and the
like. Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice no
other way than through the medium of courts of justice,
whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void. Without this, all the
1.

1 Annals of cong. 457 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789) (statement of Rep. Madison).
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reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount
to nothing.2
In modern times, politicians on both sides of the political aisle
have frequently criticized the Court for perceived instances of
"judicial activism." It has become commonplace to charge that
"celitist judges" are legislating from the bench rather than mechanically plugging in the facts and churning out the proper result dictated by legislative action or executive command. Yet such criticisms of the judiciary too often overlook the fact that judges are
often obligated, in the cases before them, to review the acts of the
other branches of government for constitutionality. Ever since
Chief Justice John Marshall authored the landmark opinion in
Marbury v. Madison3 in 1803, the judicial branch has shouldered
the responsibility of serving as a dispassionate referee, charged
with determining whether acts of Congress or the President conform to the dictates of the Constitution. This is our system of government in the United States; it has served us well for over 200
years.
The late Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist was fond of saying
that the establishment of an independent court system, possessing
the authority to declare unconstitutional laws enacted by state or
federal legislatures, is perhaps the most important contribution
the United States has made to the art of governing. 4 Without an
independent judiciary, sworn to safeguard the Constitution and
vigilantly protect citizens' rights, our form of American democracy
would not long endure.
In the short span of time since I retired from active service on
the Supreme Court in 2006, assaults on the independence of the
judicial branch have escalated on several fronts. In South Dakota,
a national advocacy group named "JAIL 4 Judges" sought, unsuccessfully, to promote a state constitutional amendment that would
have eliminated judicial immunity and allowed a special grand
jury to "censure" judges for making unpopular or undesirable legal
determinations. 5 This amounted to a thinly veiled effort to intimidate judges, by dangling the threat of punishment over their
heads like a Sword of Damocles. In Pennsylvania, an advocacy
2. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 438 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
3. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
4. Sandra Day O'Connor, Fair and Independent Courts: Remarks by Justice
O'Connor, 95 GEO. L.J. 897, 897 (2007).
5. Rachel Caufield, Judicial Elections: Today's Trends and Tomorrow's Forecast, 46
No. 1 JUDGES J. 6, *10 (2007).
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group urged voters to "vote no!" on the retention of all 68 judges
facing re-election in the relevant election cycle, on the theory that
a "clean sweep" was necessary to send a warning to judges because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had made an unpopular
decision upholding a pay-raise for the judiciary. 6 That effort
failed; 67 out of the 68 judges facing retention were approved by
the voters. In the past decade, the number of physical threats (including death threats) and inappropriate communications aimed
at judges has escalated at alarming rates. It flows from a flawed
understanding of the proper function of judges in our American
democratic system. The moment they don their robes, judges are
obligated to decide cases free from outside influences, based strictly upon the facts and the law. They cannot, and should not, be
lobbied, intimidated, threatened, or promised favors (or retribution) if they hand down decisions that are disliked or disfavored by
certain parties or factions. Without such a firewall of protection
for the judicial branch, we would lose the separation of powers the
Framers tried to create and protect.
In this special issue of the Duquesne Law Review, an impressive
list of authors tackles the most timely issues that touch upon the
subject of judicial independence. The late Chief Justice Thomas J.
Moyer of Ohio discusses the philosophical importance of an independent judiciary in the American scheme of government. Darren
Breslin of the Pennsylvania Commission on Judicial Independence
provides an historical perspective tracing the evolution of judicial
independence as a bedrock of our constitutional system.
Theodore Olson, former Solicitor General of the United States,
joins his fellow counsel David B. Fawcett in expanding upon their
brief in Caperton v. A. T Massey Coal Co. ,7 an important case that
assists in defining the contours of a judge's duty to maintain a
high level of independence from outside forces in order to avoid
even the perception of bias. This, in turn, is important in safeguarding a litigant's right to a fair and impartial trial. In Caperton the Court ultimately agreed with the Olson-Fawcett position,
establishing important new precedent in this area.
Keith Fisher, the principal draftsman of the ABA's amicus brief
in Caperton, discusses more extensively his own position on the
merits of the case. Outgoing Pennsylvania Bar Association President Clifford Haines addresses steps that the state bar association
6. Brian O'Neill, Here Stays Da Judge:
PITITSBURGH POST GAZETTE, Nov. 13, 2007, at A2.
7. 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).

The Voters Revolt Takes a Breather,
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has taken in the wake of Caperton. And Duquesne Law student
Aaron Ludwig adds an excellent note on the impact of the Caperton decision.
Turning to other cutting-edge issues in the realm of judicial independence, 'U.S. District Judge C. Darnell Jones 11 of the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania discusses the growing pressure that media places on judges, posing a risk to their independence. Finally,
David Caroline, Shira J. Goodman, and Lynn Marks of Pennsylvanians for Modern Courts address the merits and pitfalls of electing-rather than appointing-judges. This is an issue of increased importance in many states, including Pennsylvania, particularly in the wake of recent assertions that judges are susceptible to increased political influence.
In these pages of the Duquesne Law Review, readers will find a
useful array of scholarly commentary that sheds light on issues
that confront each of us who is concerned about the future of our
legal profession and our magnificent system of government in the
United States. By examining the topic of judicial independence in
this scholarly forum, we must hope-as lawyers, public servants,
and citizens-that the "impenetrable bulwark" described by James
Madison will grow even stronger.

